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HEARSAY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 
2003 VIOLATE A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO 
A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Conor Mulcahy*
Abstract: For years, judges and legislatures in common-law jurisdictions 
have struggled to develop effective and equitable rules regarding the 
admissibility of hearsay statements. Particularly in criminal cases, in which 
a defendant’s very liberty is often at stake, governments have endeavored 
to strike the balance between the prosecution’s need for probative evi-
dence against the accused and the defendant’s right to cross-examine 
those who have made statements against him. Parliament attempted to 
achieve such parity when it passed the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a 
watershed piece of legislation that signiªcantly liberalized the admissibil-
ity of hearsay statements in English and Welsh criminal trials. Because the 
Act allows the jury to convict the defendant based on uncorroborated 
hearsay evidence alone, however, it contravenes the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Introduction 
 In June of 1997, the Law Commission for England and Wales 
(Commission) released a report on possible reforms to the rule 
against hearsay in criminal trials.1 The report, entitled “Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics,” proposed sweep-
ing changes to the laws governing hearsay in criminal cases.2 The 
                                                                                                                      
* Conor Mulcahy is the Senior Production Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 Law Commission Reports 1965–2004, at 12, at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/ªles/re 
port-list.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005). 
2 See generally Law Commission for England and Wales, Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (1997), available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/ 
ªles/lc245.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005) (discussing the merits of possible reforms to the 
rule against hearsay in criminal trials). 
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Commission included a model statute at the end of the report that 
incorporated its recommendations to the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom (Parliament) in a statutory format.3
 Parliament incorporated the Commission’s recommendations in 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA),4 which received Royal Assent and 
became law on November 20, 2003.5 Yet, because the CJA signiªcantly 
liberalizes the admission of hearsay evidence in criminal trials, it may 
contravene the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, a treaty more popularly known as the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (Convention).6 In particular, the 
relaxed admissibility standards in the CJA may offend a defendant’s 
right to confront witnesses, a privilege that the Convention guaran-
tees.7
 This Note explores whether the CJA, in its current form, com-
plies with the mandates of the Convention. Speciªcally, the paper ex-
amines the Convention’s confrontation clause and its relationship to 
the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal trials. Part I discusses 
the most recent legislative developments in England and Wales con-
cerning hearsay, and will outline the history of the Convention. Part II 
explains the Commission’s proposed reforms, and also examines the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) interpretation of a de-
fendant’s right of confrontation under the Convention. Part III makes 
the claim that the CJA does, in fact, offend a criminal defendant’s 
rights under the Convention and therefore must be amended. 
I. Background 
A. Changes in Hearsay Law in England and Wales 
 Parliament created the Law Commission for England and Wales 
in 1965 “to keep the law of England and Wales under review and to 
recommend reform when it is needed.”8 The Commission publishes 
                                                                                                                      
3 See generally id. at app. A (containing the Commission’s Draft Bill of Evidence). 
4 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), §§ 114–136. 
5 See Criminal Justice System, Legislation, at http://www.cjsonline.gov.uk/the_cjs/par 
liament/legislation/index.html (last visited May 1, 2005). 
6 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(3), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228 [hereinafter European Convention on Hu-
man Rights]. 
7 See id. art. 6(3)(d), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228. 
8 Law Commission for England and Wales, Mission Statement, at http://www. 
lawcom.gov.uk (last visited May 11, 2005). 
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provisional reform proposals and collects feedback and critical com-
mentary on those ideas.9 Then, after incorporating those suggestions 
it feels are warranted, the Commission submits a ªnal proposal before 
Parliament.10
 In recent years, sometimes with the help of the Commission, Par-
liament has signiªcantly modiªed the laws relating to the admissibility 
of hearsay evidence in England and Wales.11 A 1993 report by the 
Commission stressed the need for Parliament to abolish the exclu-
sionary rule against hearsay in civil cases.12 That study led to the pas-
sage of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 that implemented the hearsay re-
forms that the Commission had advised were necessary.13 The Civil 
Evidence Act 1995 deªnes all hearsay evidence as admissible, but also 
allows the judge to determine the weight that he or she should accord 
to that evidence.14
 Until Parliament passed the CJA, the application of the rule 
against hearsay in criminal proceedings was governed primarily by the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988.15 This Act retained the traditional common 
law exceptions to the hearsay rule, including, inter alia, admissions 
and confessions of parties and their agents, statements by deceased 
persons, testimony concerning reputation, and public documents.16 
The Criminal Justice Act 1988 also created additional exceptions for 
statements contained in documents, and both the term “statements” 
and the term “documents” were “widely deªned.”17 Unfortunately, 
instead of clarifying application of the rule against hearsay, this Act 
added to the numerous exceptions to the rule and further confused 
many practitioners.18 Because the rule itself and its seemingly endless 
parade of exceptions continued to confuse the legal community, the 
                                                                                                                      
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See, e.g., Civil Evidence Act, 1995, c. 38 (Eng.) (presenting a novel approach to the 
admissibility of hearsay in civil proceedings). 
12 See Law Commission for England and Wales, Report on Hearsay in Civil Tri-
als 24 (1993), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/ªles/lc245.pdf (last visited May 1, 
2005). 
13 See generally Civil Evidence Act, 1995, c. 38 (Eng.) (applying the Commission’s rec-
ommendations). Speciªcally, the Act declares that all hearsay evidence in civil trials is 
henceforth admissible, but also directs the judge to consider the amount of weight to ac-
cord to the evidence. See id. §§ 1, 4. 
14 Id. § 4. 
15 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 19–22. 
16 See id. at 17–18; see also Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, §§ 23–28. 
17 Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 19. 
18 See id. at 48–50. 
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Secretary of State for Home Affairs asked the Commission in 1994 to 
consider whether the law of England and Wales relating to hearsay 
evidence in criminal cases needed to change.19
 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) had recom-
mended that the Secretary make the request to the Commission be-
cause the RCCJ believed the law governing hearsay in criminal cases 
to be “exceptionally complex and difªcult to interpret.”20 In order to 
ameliorate the situation, the RCCJ suggested that the Commission 
ponder the efªcacy of a law that would relax—or even abolish—the 
rule against the admission of hearsay in criminal trials.21
 This particular recommendation, which, if eventually imple-
mented, would signiªcantly curtail the common-law rule against hear-
say,22 was not a complete surprise to the Commission. Indeed, the 
Commission had agreed with the same suggestion in its report on 
hearsay in civil trials.23 Despite the fact that the Commission was 
treading on familiar ground, however, recommending hearsay reform 
in criminal trials involved different, more complicated questions. 
 First of all, the decreased role of the jury in civil trials caused 
much of the support for reform of the rule against hearsay in civil 
proceedings.24 One of the core purposes of common-law courts’ ex-
clusion of hearsay is to protect the jury from considering untrust-
worthy evidence to be inherently true and valid.25 Although civil trials 
in England and Wales used to be conducted in front of juries, it is ex-
tremely rare now for these proceedings to involve juries.26 Because 
judges, who are legally trained and thus more aware of the dangers of 
hearsay evidence, now act as factªnders in the great majority of civil 
cases, both the Commission and Parliament found that there was little 
                                                                                                                      
19 Id. at 1. 
20 Id. (quoting Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report, ch. 8, para. 26 
(1993)). 
21 See id. at 1–2 (quoting Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Report, ch. 8, 
para. 26 (1993)). 
22 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that 
“[t]he Royal Commission advocated major reform” when it made its statements about 
hearsay in criminal proceedings). 
23 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 12, at 24. 
24 See generally Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Ju-
ries and Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7 (1999) (chronicling 
the decline of the jury in English and Welsh trials). 
25 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 28–29 (footnotes 
omitted). 
26 See Lloyd-Bostock & Thomas, supra note 24, at 7–8. 
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need for this prophylactic exclusion of evidence.27 The judge would 
just have to make an informed choice about how much weight to ac-
cord to the hearsay evidence.28 Parliament codiªed this approach in 
the Civil Evidence Act 1995.29 Yet the Commission could not make the 
same argument regarding hearsay in criminal proceedings because 
those cases are still tried by juries in England and Wales.30
 Furthermore, the Commission could not rely upon its earlier 
analysis of hearsay in civil cases because, generally, the stakes are 
higher in criminal trials than in civil ones.31 Because a criminal con-
viction is the ultimate form of societal moral condemnation, the gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom would not want to convict an inno-
cent defendant on erroneous information contained in a hearsay 
statement.32 Thus, the Commission needed to scrutinize the question 
of hearsay reform in criminal cases more carefully than it had in its 
report on hearsay in civil proceedings.33
B. Hearsay and The European Convention on Human Rights 
 In addition, the Commission needed to pay close attention to the 
mandates of the European Convention on Human Rights.34 After ex-
periencing the atrocities of World War II, a number of European 
countries decided to codify certain inalienable rights within a treaty, 
and the Convention was the result of their labors.35 The rights con-
tained in the document echoed those that the United Nations had 
recently recognized in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights.36
 Provisions in the Convention established the ECHR and gave the 
court jurisdiction to decide whether a member country had violated 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 12, at 23–24. 
28 See id. at 29–30. 
29 Civil Evidence Act, 1995, c. 38, § 4 (Eng.). 
30 See Lloyd-Bostock & Thomas, supra note 24, at 13. 
31 Cf. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 6(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 
228 (enumerating special rights for criminal defendants alone). 
32 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 32. 
33 See id. 
34 See generally European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6 (binding its signa-
tories to its terms and guaranteeing minimum rights to everyone charged with a criminal 
offense). 
35 Roger W. Kirst, Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in the European Court of Human 
Rights, 21 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 777, 777 (2003). 
36 Id. (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(iii), U.N. Doc. 
A/810, at 71 (1948)). 
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the Convention.37 The parties to the treaty also agreed that the ECHR 
could bestow just satisfaction upon harmed parties, and that the 
member countries would abide by the decisions of the court.38 Thus, 
as a party to the treaty, the government of the United Kingdom must 
adhere to the Convention’s dictates on the inherent rights of criminal 
defendants.39
 Furthermore, the United Kingdom is one of the many signatories 
of the Convention that has incorporated the treaty into its own law.40 
Thus, if an English subject wishes to challenge his criminal conviction 
because he believes it offends the Convention, the English appellate 
courts must rule on that question.41 In fact, the ECHR will not con-
sider a case until after the aggrieved party has exhausted all state 
remedies.42
 When the ECHR does agree to hear a case, it does not sit as a 
single panel.43 Instead, proceedings take place before a chamber of 
seven judges, or, from time to time, before a Grand Chamber of sev-
enteen judges.44 Because more than forty judges currently sit on the 
ECHR, and the panels consist of seventeen jurists at most, there is 
never a time when all of the judges hear a case together.45 Thus, the 
panels that decide the cases do not have the consistency and continu-
ity of the U.S. Supreme Court.46
II. Discussion 
 The rule against hearsay in England and Wales is generally 
deªned as follows: “any assertion other than one made by a person 
                                                                                                                      
37 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 
234; Kirst, supra note 35, at 777. 
38 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 
234; Kirst, supra note 35, at 777. 
39 See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, arts. 6(3), 46, 213 
U.N.T.S. at 228, 246. It is important to note, however, that the ECHR has no power to re-
verse a conviction or to order any comparable action by a municipal court. Kirst, supra 
note 35, at 781. 
40 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), §§ 1–4; Council of Eur., The European Con-
vention on Human Rights, at http://www.humanrights.coe.int/intro/eng/GENERAL/ 
ECHR.HTM (last visited May 11, 2005). Ireland and Norway are the only parties to the Con-
vention that have not included the document as part of their own domestic laws. Id. 
41 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.), §§ 2, 4. 
42 See Kirst, supra note 35, at 780; Council of Europe, supra note 40. 
43 Kirst, supra note 35, at 780. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. at 780–81. 
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while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evi-
dence of any fact or opinion asserted.”47 The theory behind the rule 
is that it protects juries from hearing or seeing evidence that may be 
patently false or untrue.48 Because the author of a hearsay statement 
is neither under oath nor subject to cross-examination at the time she 
makes the statement, it is impossible to know if the statement actually 
is true.49 Over time, through both the common-law process50 and leg-
islation,51 the general rule evolved to include many exceptions that 
allow parties to introduce hearsay evidence at trial.52 Most exceptions 
involve certain types of evidence that lawmakers believed were inher-
ently reliable despite the fact that they are based on hearsay.53 After 
witnessing the confusion surrounding interpretation of the hearsay 
exceptions in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, practitioners and judges 
alike hoped for more sensible admissibility rules.54
A. The Commission’s Hearsay Analysis 
 The goal of the Commission in its report on criminal hearsay was 
to simplify and rationalize the application of the rule against hear-
say.55 Well aware of the consequences of changing evidence rules in 
criminal cases, the Commission came to its conclusions by carefully 
considering all of the arguments that could be made against further 
liberalizing admission of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings.56
 First, the Commission considered the proposition that hearsay 
evidence, by its nature, is not the “best evidence” upon which 
factªnders could rely.57 It concluded, however, that the many excep-
tions to the hearsay rule show that hearsay is, quite often, the best 
available evidence.58 If hearsay could never be the best evidence, 
there would be no need for admissibility of any hearsay evidence at 
any time, because some other piece of “better” evidence could sup-
                                                                                                                      
47 Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 16 (citation omitted). 
48 See id. at 23. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 17–18. 
51 See id. at 18–22. 
52 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 17–22. 
53 See id. at 23–24. 
54 See id. at 1–2. 
55 See id. at 2. 
56 See id. at 23–34 (discussing the merits of the justiªcations for a strict rule against 
hearsay). 
57 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
58 See id. 
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plant it.59 The many exceptions to the rule against hearsay belie this 
assumption; judges and legislatures never would have created the ex-
ceptions unless such hearsay evidence was the best available evi-
dence.60
 The Commission then worried about the chance that a criminal 
defendant “could produce in evidence a letter or witness statement in 
which the declarant—alas, now unavailable—claims to have seen the 
offense being committed by someone other than the defendant” or 
perhaps one that supports his alibi.61 Such evidence could then raise 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, and the guilty man would 
go free.62 Although this possibility concerned the Commission, it ul-
timately felt that they could avoid this danger by retaining the exclu-
sionary rule for instances of multiple hearsay and hearsay from uni-
dentiªed witnesses.63
 The Commission next considered the fact that hearsay evidence 
is not delivered by people under oath.64 It quickly dismissed this ob-
jection because there is no guarantee that an oath or afªrmation, in 
itself, promotes truthful testimony.65 Instead, the Commission was 
more concerned about “the objection to hearsay most strongly 
pressed today[,]” namely the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine 
the author of a hearsay statement.66 After admitting that cross-
examination is not always probative of the truth, the Commission 
nonetheless found this particular rationale for the rule against hear-
say to be the most valid.67 Yet the Commission also felt that “even this 
justiªcation is not valid for all hearsay, and in any event it does not 
justify the current form of the hearsay rule.”68
 The next subject that the Commission discussed in its report was 
the danger that juries would assign undeserved probative force to 
hearsay evidence.69 Many commentators doubt the competence of 
jurors to understand the complex jury instructions that would be 
necessary to inform them of the possible untrustworthiness of hearsay 
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 Id. at 24. 
62 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 24. 
63 See id. at 25. 
64 Id. at 26. 
65 Id. at 27. 
66 Id. 
67 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 28. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 28–29. 
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evidence.70 The Commission rejected this argument, reasoning that 
judges often give juries complicated instructions on other points of 
law, and society assumes that the jury understands them.71 Because 
the Commission was conªdent in the jury’s ability to comprehend 
warnings on hearsay, it found that it could justify a recommendation 
for additional exceptions to the rule against hearsay.72
 The Commission also considered another argument against liber-
alization of the rule against hearsay: the right of a defendant to con-
front witnesses against her.73 Its rationale is based upon the premise 
that it is easier to lie to someone behind her back rather than to her 
face.74 The Commission noted, however, that recent developments in 
England and Wales show that this view is no longer persuasive in those 
countries.75 Nevertheless, the Commission conceded that “it is desir-
able for witnesses to give their evidence in the presence of the accused 
if possible,” but also commented that “there are other factors which 
may outweigh the need for this[,]”76 such as “the impossibility of ob-
taining the evidence directly from the witness in the courtroom.”77
 Thus, after discussing the pervasive rationales for the exclusion-
ary rule against hearsay, the Commission concluded that the only rea-
son that hearsay is inferior evidence is because advocates cannot test it 
through cross-examination.78 Therefore, the Commission drafted its 
reform recommendations with the notion that the inability to cross-
examine is the sole defect in admitting hearsay into evidence.79 After 
contemplating the merits of several methods of reform, the Commis-
sion set forth a Draft Criminal Evidence Bill (Draft Bill) that incorpo-
rated the Commission’s recommendations to Parliament.80
                                                                                                                      
70 See, e.g., id. (quoting Sir Patrick Devlin, Trial By Jury 114 (revised 3d impression 
1965)). 
71 See id. at 30–31. 
72 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
73 See id. at 33–34. 
74 Id. at 33. 
75 See id. (mentioning how England and Wales permit witnesses to give evidence from 
behind a screen, or via closed circuit television). 
76 Id. 
77 Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 33 n.74. 
78 Id. at 34. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at app. A. 
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B. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 When Parliament formulated the hearsay provisions of the CJA, it 
used the Commission’s Draft Bill as its principal model.81 In fact, Par-
liament copied several sections of the CJA nearly verbatim from the 
Draft Bill.82 The lengthy CJA begins by abolishing the traditional rule 
that hearsay is barred from evidence unless an exception exists that al-
lows its admission.83 Instead, the statute states that hearsay is admissi-
ble, but only under certain circumstances.84 Of course, this is simply 
the corollary to the traditional rule; to say that hearsay is admissible 
only in certain exceptional situations is to say that hearsay is inadmissi-
ble unless those exceptional situations exist.85 Thus, although the CJA 
does not refer to its provisions as “exceptions” per se, from a practical 
standpoint, they function as exceptions to the rule against hearsay. 
 The statute, like the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence, contains dif-
ferent exceptions depending upon whether the author of a hearsay 
statement is available or unavailable to give testimony at trial.86 A per-
son is unavailable under the statute if she is dead, mentally or physi-
cally unªt to be a witness, outside the U.K. and it is not practical to 
secure her attendance, cannot be found after reasonable endeavors to 
locate her, or is in “fear” and the court allows her to not testify.87 The 
statute notes that courts should construe “fear” liberally; for example, 
a court could consider a witness who is afraid of ªnancial loss due to 
her testimony to be in “fear.”88 However, the court must ªrst grant 
leave before admitting a hearsay statement into evidence because its 
author is in “fear,”89 and the court should only do so “if [it] considers 
that the statement ought to be admitted in the interests of justice.”90
                                                                                                                      
81 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), Explanatory Notes, para. 50, available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en2003/03en44-a.htm (last visited May 1, 2005). The Crimi-
nal Justice Act 2003 is a very long and complex statute. Because the focus of this Note is 
whether the Act’s modiªcations of the rule against hearsay contravene the confrontation 
clause of the Convention (Article 6(3)(d)), this Note will only examine those sections of the 
statute immediately relevant to this focus. 
82 Compare, e.g., id. § 116, with Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 
2, at app. A §§ 3, 5. 
83 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 114(1). 
84 See id. 
85 Compare id. with Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at app. A 
§ 1. 
86 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 116; Fed. R. Evid. 803–804. 
87 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 116(2). 
88 Id. § 116(3). 
89 Id. § 116(4). 
90 Id. 
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 The statute goes on to state that, if the court ªnds that a witness 
is unavailable, a prior statement by that witness is admissible when two 
conditions are met.91 The witness must be “identiªed to the court’s 
satisfaction,”92 and the statement must be such that “oral evidence 
given in the proceedings by the person who made the statement 
would be admissible as evidence of that matter.”93 In other words, an 
unavailable witness cannot be anonymous, and his or her statement is 
only admissible if it would be admissible if he or she were present.94
 In addition, a business record that was “prepared for the purposes 
of pending or contemplated criminal proceedings, or for a criminal 
investigation” is nevertheless admissible if the person who created the 
record is unavailable or “cannot reasonably be expected to have any 
recollection of the matters dealt with in the statement.”95 However, the 
judge has discretion to deem such business records inadmissible if he 
or she believes that the evidence is unreliable.96 In determining 
whether the evidence is trustworthy, the judge must look to the state-
ment’s contents, the source of the information contained in the state-
ment, the circumstances in which the information was supplied, or the 
circumstances in which the document was created or received.97
 The statute also recognizes various exceptions to the rule against 
hearsay when a witness is available to testify.98 For example, a previous 
statement by a testifying witness is admissible to prove the truth of its 
content if several conditions are met.99 While testifying in court, the 
witness must indicate that, to the best of his belief, he made the 
statement and it states the truth.100 In addition, the statement must 
identify or describe a person, object, or place.101 The witness must 
have made the statement “when the matters stated were fresh in his 
memory but he does not remember them, and cannot reasonably be 
expected to remember them, well enough to give oral evidence of 
them in the proceedings.”102 Furthermore, the witness must claim to 
                                                                                                                      
91 See id. § 116(1). 
92 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 116(1)(b). 
93 Id. § (1)(a). 
94 See id. § 116(1)(a)–(b). 
95 See id. § 117(4)(a), § 117(5). 
96 Id. § 117(6)–(7). 
97 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 117(7). 
98 See, e.g., id. §§ 119–120. 
99 See id. § 120(4)–(8). 
100 Id. § 120(4)(b). 
101 Id. § 120(5). 
102 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 120(6). 
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be a person against whom an offense has been committed, the offense 
must relate to the proceedings, and the hearsay statement must con-
sist of a complaint by the witness about conduct which would, if 
proved, constitute all or part of the offense.103
 This seemingly esoteric exception to the rule against hearsay is 
actually quite logical when divorced from its statutory language.104 
The Commission included this exception in its Draft Bill in order to 
make admissible statements by crime victims that described elements 
of the crime shortly after the offense took place.105 For example, if a 
crime victim, soon after being attacked, described the assailant to a 
police ofªcer, but cannot remember at trial exactly what he said at the 
time, his original statements are nevertheless admissible because of 
this exception.106
 Perhaps the most controversial provision in the CJA pertains to 
judicial discretion to admit hearsay evidence that the enumerated ex-
ceptions do not speciªcally cover.107 Section 114(1)(d) of the statute 
states that hearsay evidence can be admissible “if the court is satisªed 
that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible.”108 This 
catchall exception is akin to the residual hearsay exception in the U.S. 
Federal Rules of Evidence, but its language is somewhat broader.109 
Despite the elasticity of the language in 114(1)(d), it is noteworthy 
that the Commission, in discussing an almost identical provision in 
the Draft Bill, envisioned that “it would only be used exceptionally.”110
C. Hearsay Cases in the ECHR 
 The ªrst case in which the ECHR dealt explicitly with criminal 
convictions based on hearsay evidence was Unterpertinger v. Austria.111 
In that case, the defendant had been accused of assaulting his wife 
                                                                                                                      
103 Id. § 120(7)(a)–(c). Also, the victim must have made the complaint as soon as 
could reasonably be expected after the alleged conduct, the victim cannot have made the 
complaint because of a threat or a promise, and the witness must give oral evidence in 
connection with the statement before it is brought into evidence. Id. § 120(7)(d)–(f). 
104 See id. § 120(4)–(8); see also Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 
2, at 156–57. 
105 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 156–57. 
106 See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 120(4)–(8). 
107 See id. § 114(1)(d). 
108 Id. 
109 Compare id. with Fed. R. Evid. 807. 
110 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 129. 
111 Kirst, supra note 35, at 782 (citing Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
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and stepdaughter, but neither testiªed against him at trial.112 The 
only evidence that the government introduced against the defendant 
was police reports containing statements that the two women had 
made to the authorities.113 The defendant was found guilty on the 
basis of this evidence alone.114 The ECHR held that, because he had 
not been able to cross-examine either his wife or his stepdaughter 
about the only evidence against him, the conviction violated the Con-
vention.115 Instead of speciªcally pointing to the confrontation clause 
in article 6(3)(d), however, the court justiªed its decision based on 
the defendant’s general right to a fair trial as deªned in article 6.116 
The opinion did not proscribe the use of hearsay in all criminal cases, 
but rather warned that a state could not use hearsay evidence if it de-
prived the defendant of a fair trial.117
 Subsequent cases helped to deªne, more adequately, situations in 
which prosecutorial use of hearsay evidence contravened the Conven-
tion. In Barbera v. Spain, evidence against the defendants included a 
written statement by their former accomplice, made when he was in 
police custody, in which he accused the defendants of committing the 
crime for which they were charged.118 Before trial, the witness disap-
peared and the authorities could not locate him.119 The court held 
that the trial was unfair, primarily because the defendants did not 
have the opportunity to cross-examine their former accomplice.120
 Another case that further clariªed the relationship between hear-
say and a defendant’s right to a fair trial was Delta v. France.121 In that 
case, a robbery victim and her companion failed to appear in court 
despite having been summoned.122 Although they were the only wit-
nesses to the crime, the French courts allowed the police ofªcer who 
had taken their statements to testify as to what they had told him, and 
the defendant was found guilty on the basis of that evidence.123 Be-




115 Id. (citing Unterpertinger, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15, § 33). 
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119 Id. 
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cause the defendant never had an opportunity to examine either of 
the witnesses, the ECHR held that his trial had been unfair.124
 The Ludi v. Switzerland case demonstrates that a trial can be un-
fair even if the hearsay evidence in question was not the only proba-
tive evidence against the defendant.125 In Ludi, a drug trafªcking 
case, the evidence against the defendant included several telephone 
calls that the government had intercepted, statements by the defen-
dant after he was arrested, statements by co-defendants, and a report 
by an undercover ofªcer.126 The ofªcer refused to testify in order to 
preserve his anonymity, and the defendant argued that his absence 
rendered the trial unfair.127 The ECHR agreed, ªnding that the fact 
the ofªcer was unavailable for cross-examination, despite the exis-
tence of alternative ways to testify that would have preserved his ano-
nymity, made the trial unfair.128
 Although it would seem from the preceding cases that the ECHR 
believes that violations of the Convention exist whenever hearsay evi-
dence is the signiªcant basis upon which the government relied to 
convict the defendants, other cases indicate that this assumption is 
incorrect.129 For example, in Isgro v. Italy, the court found that 
the prosecution’s use of a hearsay accusation by an alleged accom-
plice did not create an unfair trial for several reasons: (1) the accom-
plice was not anonymous; (2) the defendant did confront the accom-
plice at a hearing before the investigating judge at which each 
accused the other of lying; (3) the defendant did not contest the im-
partiality of the investigating judge; and (4) the accusation by the ac-
complice was not the only evidence.130
 Likewise, in Asch v. Austria, a case with facts almost identical to 
Unterpertinger, the ECHR held that the Austrian government had not 
violated the Convention.131 The court distinguished Uterpertinger by 
noting that the government’s use of the victim’s statement to police 
was not the only evidence upon which the trial court relied to convict 
the defendant.132
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 The ECHR attempted to clarify its policy on hearsay and the 
Convention in Ferrantelli v. Italy.133 The defendants in the case had 
been convicted of murdering two police ofªcers.134 The evidence 
against the defendants included their, and an alleged accomplice’s, 
confessions to police.135 In the alleged co-conspirator’s ªrst confes-
sion, he stated that he had committed the murders with the two de-
fendants.136 The next day, he retracted that statement and instead 
said that he acted alone.137 Before the defendants’ trial, however, the 
accomplice committed suicide.138 The Italian court used the ªrst con-
fession, in which the accomplice had identiªed the defendants as cul-
pable, to convict the defendants.139
 The ECHR found that the use of the original confession did not 
violate the Convention.140 The court noted that all evidence “must 
normally be produced in the presence of the accused at a public hear-
ing,”141 and that generally the prosecution must give the defendant an 
opportunity to question a witness at some point.142 Recognizing that 
these rules are not absolutes, however, the ECHR held that Italy had 
not contravened the Convention.143 As Professor Kirst notes, however, 
the court “did not describe the standard by which it would determine 
when it was permissible for a court to deviate from the rules that 
should normally be followed.”144
 Although the ECHR has not, as of yet, made that standard ex-
plicit, two more recent cases help to shed light on the subject. In Ver-
dam v. Netherlands, the defendant had been convicted of raping several 
women.145 The prosecution could not locate two of the women for 
testimony at trial, so instead it used the statements the women had 
given to police.146 Defense counsel had been present for only one of 
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the statements.147 The ECHR insinuated that, if the conviction had 
been based “to a decisive extent” on hearsay statements, the court 
would ªnd the trial to be unfair.148 On the contrary, the ECHR also 
found that a trial court could rely on evidence that corroborated the 
truth of hearsay statements.149 If such corroborating evidence existed, 
use of the hearsay evidence would not offend the Convention.150
 The fact that the prosecution had no corroborating evidence 
against the defendant in Luca v. Italy rendered his trial unfair according 
to the court.151 In that case, the defendant was convicted of drug 
crimes because a man who the authorities caught possessing cocaine 
indicated that the defendant had sold it to him.152 The informant had 
refused to testify at trial in order to protect himself from self-
incrimination.153 The ECHR held that, because the conviction was 
based solely upon the statements of a person whom the defendant was 
never able to question, the trial had been unfair.154
D. The Commission’s Analysis of the ECHR Hearsay Cases 
 When the Law Commission for England and Wales wrote its re-
port and drafted its model statute on hearsay in criminal cases, the 
Draft Bill that Parliament substantially copied when drafting the CJA, 
the Commission was keenly aware that the United Kingdom was a sig-
natory to the Convention and, as such, had agreed to honor the 
mandates of the treaty.155 In its report, after examining the ECHR 
cases discussed above, the Commission came to several conclusions 
about the relationship between hearsay and the right to a fair trial as 
guaranteed by the Convention.156
 First, the Commission analyzed the use of the word “witness” in 
article 6(3)(d), which states that every defendant in a criminal case 
has the right “to examine or have examined witnesses against him.”157 
On the basis of its analysis of ECHR cases, the Commission concluded 
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that “the word ‘witness’ goes beyond its usual meaning (to an English 
lawyer) of someone who attends the trial to give oral evidence.”158 In-
stead, the meaning of “witness” includes a person who has made a 
statement to police that the prosecution then attempts to enter into 
evidence at trial.159 Yet the Commission also noted that all of the peo-
ple whom the ECHR has deªned as “witnesses” were those who have 
voluntarily given information to criminal justice ofªcials.160 In other 
words, just because a witness testifying at trial repeats the comments 
of a third person not present at trial to prove the truth of the com-
ments, there is no guarantee that the Convention affords the defen-
dant the right to question the absent individual.161 Even though an 
English court would certainly identify such testimony as hearsay, the 
ECHR would not necessarily consider the third person to be a “wit-
ness” under article 6(3)(d) of the Convention, thus eradicating the 
possibility of a violation under that section of the treaty.162
 After concluding that the ECHR cases clearly indicate that the 
defendant does not have an inherent right to question witnesses 
against him at trial,163 the Commission considered a more difªcult 
question—is it ever possible to enter the statement of an absent wit-
ness into evidence if the defendant has never had the opportunity to 
question that witness?164 The Commission posited that two interpreta-
tions are possible.165 A literal reading of the Convention suggests a 
negative answer, because article 6(3) explicitly states that every crimi-
nal defendant has the rights listed in subparts (a) through (e), which 
include the right “to examine or have examined witnesses against 
him.”166 Unterpertinger took this strict constructionist view.167
 The Commission, however, adopted an alternative theory, namely 
that “the rights expressly conferred by article 6(3) are not absolute 
rights: they are merely factors which have to be considered in deciding 
a broader question—‘Did the defendant receive a fair trial as required 
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by article 6(1)?’”168 In the Commission’s view, a trial in which the 
statements of a witness whom the defendant has never questioned are 
admitted is not unfair under the Convention, provided that two condi-
tions are met: (1) it must be impossible to produce the witness for 
questioning; and, more importantly, (2) other evidence must support 
any hearsay statements used against the defendant.169 Several ECHR 
decisions, according to the Commission, indicated that the more liberal 
approach to interpretation of article 6(3) had become the law.170
 Despite its rejection of the strict constructionist view, the Commis-
sion’s original conclusion regarding the relationship between hearsay 
evidence and article 6(3) was that hearsay, unsupported by any other 
probative evidence, could not be sufªcient proof of any element of a 
crime.171 But many jurists and scholars criticized that position, arguing 
that the ECHR did not consider the existence of supporting evidence 
to be a necessary component of a fair trial.172 Moreover, other pundits 
worried that disagreement over what actually constitutes “supporting 
evidence” would produce endless litigation and a great deal of confu-
sion.173
 Having accepted this criticism as valid, the Commission chose not 
to include a supporting evidence requirement into the Draft Bill.174 
Instead, the Commission included a “catch-all” provision, article 14, 
which, in their opinion, would ensure the statute’s compliance with 
the Convention.175 Parliament apparently agreed with the Commis-
sion’s analysis and, in lieu of implementing a corroborating evidence 
requirement, included the majority of the language from article 14 in 
section 125 of the CJA.176 Section 125 states that if 
(a) the case against the accused is based wholly or partly on 
a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings, 
and (b) the evidence provided by the statement is so uncon-
vincing that, considering its importance to the case against 
the defendant, his conviction of the offence would be un-
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safe, the court must either direct the jury to acquit the de-
fendant of the offence or, if it considers that there ought to 
be a retrial, discharge the jury.177
Parliament most likely concurred with the view of the Commission 
that article 14, acting together with other safeguards such as the pro-
hibition against the admissibility of anonymous witnesses’ hearsay 
statements, would provide “adequate protection for the accused” un-
der the Convention.178
III. Analysis 
A. Gaps Between the Commission’s Analysis and ECHR Case Law 
 Certainly, the Commission put forth a good faith effort to ensure 
that its Draft Bill complied with the Convention and, speciªcally, arti-
cle 6(3).179 Yet the Commission itself recognized that the ECHR cases 
are somewhat inconsistent and often difªcult to reconcile with one 
another.180 Furthermore, the ECHR tends to view the Convention as 
an ambulatory document; therefore, the court’s interpretation of the 
treaty has changed—and will continue to change—over time.181 Be-
cause the court takes such a ºexible approach, it is nearly impossible 
to predict whether particular governmental practices of the member 
countries will, in fact, offend the Convention.182
 Even so, the ECHR case law strongly supports many of the Com-
mission’s conclusions regarding the hearsay jurisprudence of the 
court. For example, it is clear that the Convention does not require all 
witnesses against a defendant to testify at trial in order for their state-
ments to be admissible.183 In addition, the court will not ªnd that a 
trial was unfair simply because hearsay evidence was most likely a ma-
jor factor in the defendant’s conviction.184 Although the cases do not 
necessarily draw a ªrm line between fair and unfair use of hearsay, the 
Commission was correct in stating that, in order to violate the Con-
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vention, the evidence must be so untrustworthy that the fundamental 
fairness of the trial is in question.185
 In contrast, the reasoning of the Commission was deªcient when 
it dealt with the question of convictions premised upon hearsay 
statements alone. The ECHR has held repeatedly that a trial is unfair 
if the defendant’s conviction was predicated on an uncorroborated 
hearsay statement and the defendant never had the opportunity to 
question the statement’s author.186 In all fairness to the Commission, 
however, the ECHR did not decide Luca, the case which clariªed the 
need for corroboration in cases based solely on hearsay, until after the 
Commission had written its report.187 Parliament, on the other hand, 
enacted the CJA after the Luca decision had been handed down, so 
the legislators should have been on notice that the Convention man-
dates a corroboration requirement.188
 Thus, the CJA contains several provisions that may contravene 
article 6(3) of the Convention. One such area of concern is section 
116, which makes previous statements of a witness admissible if that 
witness is unavailable at trial.189 This provision seems to suggest that 
the recorded statements of an unavailable witness, such as a deceased 
person, would be admissible against the defendant, regardless of 
whether she ever had the opportunity to question that witness.190 Be-
cause analysis of the ECHR cases shows that convictions based upon 
hearsay evidence alone are inherently unfair if the defendant never 
had the opportunity to question the author of the hearsay statements, 
the court would almost certainly ªnd a conviction based on such evi-
dence to be unfair.191
 Although Parliament did not heed the teachings of Luca when it 
created the CJA, it did include section 125 in an attempt to anticipate 
                                                                                                                      
185 See id. at 782–83. 
186 See id. at 782 (citing Unterpertinger, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986)); id. at 783 (cit-
ing Barbera, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)); id. at 787 (citing Delta, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) (1990)). 
187 See id. at 796–97 (citing Luca, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 167 (2001)) (making explicit the 
formerly implicit requirement that corroborating evidence is necessary when the convic-
tion is dependent upon an untested hearsay statement). 
188 See id. 
189 See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 116. 
190 See id. § 116(1)–(2)(a). 
191 See Kirst, supra note 35, at 782 (citing Unterpertinger, 110 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1986)); id. at 783 (citing Barbera, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)); id. at 787 (citing Delta, 
191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990)). 
2005] Anti-Hearsay Rule & European Convention on Human Rights 425 
future developments in the interpretation of the Convention.192 De-
spite the fact that Parliament was incorrect in its assumptions about 
the relationship between hearsay and corroborating evidence, there is 
a possibility that section 125 renders that issue moot.193
B. Section 125 and the Luca Corroboration Requirement 
 Section 125 requires the judge to direct a verdict for the defen-
dant when his conviction could only be based upon hearsay evidence 
that is “so unconvincing that, considering its importance to the case 
against the defendant, his conviction of the offence would be un-
safe.”194 Thus, in order to comply with the Convention as interpreted 
in Luca, English and Welsh appellate judges simply could hold that 
any uncorroborated hearsay is inherently unconvincing.195 Perhaps 
this is self-evident; after all, it is difªcult to imagine that English or 
Welsh judges, historically distrustful of hearsay, would be willing to 
convict someone of a crime based on hearsay evidence alone.196
 However, the Commission did not believe that every case in 
which a conviction was premised upon uncorroborated hearsay would 
be inherently “unconvincing.”197 The Commission gave an example in 
which uncorroborated hearsay could, in fact, be quite convincing, 
stating that “the hearsay statement might consist of a statement in a 
business document prepared by somebody with substantial knowledge 
of the matters set out, and yet be incapable of any form of corrobora-
tion save for a statement by the writer’s superior that the writer was a 
reliable and conscientious employee.”198 The Commission’s desire to 
allow such a case to proceed to the factªnder persuaded the Commis-
sion to reject a corroboration requirement.199 Instead, the Commis-
sion wrote section 14, hoping that it would ensure the Draft Bill’s 
compliance with the Convention without forcing judges to direct a 
verdict in all cases based on uncorroborated hearsay.200 Therefore, in 
the Commission’s view, section 14, as written, allows judges to submit 
                                                                                                                      
192 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 67–68 (discussing 
the rationale for creating section 14 of the Draft Bill, which is virtually identical to section 
125). 
193 See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 125. 
194 Id. § 125(1)(b). 
195 See id.; Kirst, supra note 35, at 797 (citing Luca, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 167 (2001)). 
196 See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44 (Eng.), § 125. 
197 See Law Commission for England and Wales, supra note 2, at 67. 
198 Id. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. at 67; see also id. at app. A § 14(1). 
426 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 28:405 
some cases based solely upon uncorroborated hearsay to the 
factªnder.201 It stands to reason that, since section 125 of the CJA is 
almost an exact duplication of section 14, Parliament intended sec-
tion 125 to be interpreted similarly.202
 Thus, judicial scrutiny of section 125 presents a signiªcant prob-
lem. In Parliament’s view, section 125 does not apply to some cases 
based on uncorroborated hearsay,203 but the ECHR has held that con-
victions based upon hearsay are unfair unless there is corroborating 
evidence.204 Therefore, if appellate judges were to construe the statue 
in accordance with the drafters’ intent, it would contravene the Con-
vention.205 Even so, such an interpretation may never arise, because 
the United Kingdom has incorporated the Convention into its own 
domestic law.206 As such, it would seem that the ECHR case law, and 
Luca speciªcally, would bind the English and Welsh appellate courts, 
thereby requiring them to hold that the evidence in cases based upon 
uncorroborated hearsay is per se “unconvincing.”207
 On the other hand, if Parliament were simply to amend section 
125, there would be no possibility of judicial interpretation issues.208 
Parliament would only have to add a short statement within the sec-
tion, clarifying the corroboration requirement.209 It should amend 
section 125(1)(b) by splitting it into two subparts.210 The amended 
section 14(1)(b) should read, “(i) the statement is not corroborated 
by other evidence, or (ii) the evidence provided by the statement is so 
unconvincing that, considering its importance to the case against the 
accused, his conviction of the offence would be unsafe.”211
 This amendment would guarantee that English and Welsh judges 
direct verdicts for defendants when their convictions could only be 
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the result of uncorroborated hearsay evidence.212 The amendment 
would also retain Parliament’s prohibition against convictions prem-
ised upon “unconvincing” hearsay.213 Furthermore, as amended, the 
statutory construction would clarify any possible ambiguity about 
whether uncorroborated hearsay is necessarily “unconvincing.”214 Be-
cause the amended statute would state explicitly that a case based 
upon uncorroborated hearsay always requires a directed verdict, 
judges would not have to decide the question.215
 Certainly, this proposed amendment would not render the CJA 
completely free of issues of interpretation.216 The corroboration re-
quirement that the ECHR announced in Luca raises many complex 
problems.217 Most notably, it is impossible to know, at this point, how 
much evidence the prosecution must produce in order to satisfy the 
corroboration requirement in cases premised upon hearsay.218 Fur-
thermore, considering the instability of ECHR precedent, it is difªcult 
to determine whether the corroboration requirement will survive.219 
Based on the cases available currently, however, the CJA contravenes 
the Convention in its present form.220 Therefore, either Parliament or 
the appellate bench must take measures, such as those noted above, 
to make it conform with the treaty.221
Conclusion 
 In creating its Draft Bill, the Commission took reasonable steps 
to ensure that the statute would comply with the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. However, the Commission’s theory that a con-
viction based solely upon uncorroborated hearsay would not violate 
the Convention proved to be incorrect. Further, by including substan-
tial portions of the Draft Bill in the CJA, Parliament enacted a law that 
contravenes the treaty. Although section 125 of the Act contains lan-
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guage that the Commission assumed would prevent contravention of 
the Convention, that provision is inadequate because it does not ex-
plicitly contain a corroboration requirement. Therefore, Parliament 
should amend section 125 of the CJA so that the statute recognizes 
the need for corroborating evidence in criminal cases based solely 
upon hearsay statements. 
